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Abstract
A formalization of the Threshold Theory, called the Probabilistic Threshold Model, is
introduced. According to the Threshold Theory semantic categorization decisions come
about through the placement of a threshold criterion along a dimension that represents
items’ similarity to the category representation. The adequacy of this theory is assessed
by applying the Probabilistic Threshold Model to categorization data for eight natural
language categories and subjecting it to a formal test. In validating the model special care
is given to its ability to account for inter- and intra-individual differences in categorization
and their relationship with item typicality. Extensions of the Probabilistic Threshold
Model that can be used to uncover the nature of category representations and the sources
of categorization differences are discussed.
Keywords: Categories; Graded membership; Typicality; Similarity; Rasch model
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The Probabilistic Threshold Model
Introduction
From the work of McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) it is known that natural
language categories do not have fixed extensions. That is to say, people disagree on the
items they are willing to endorse as category members and individuals do not endorse the
same items on different occasions. This is particularly true of items that are moderately
typical of the category. To the question of whether a parachute is a member of the
vehicle category, for instance, 52% yes and 48% no responses were given in the
McCloskey and Glucksberg study. Thirthy percent of the respondents changed their
answer from the first to the second categorization session. An independent group of judges
awarded the item an average typicality score of 4.38 out of 10. For items at the extreme
ends of the typicality scale, respondents categorized much more consistently. All
respondents agreed that the highly typical car is a vehicle, while no one made a similar
claim for the atypical apartment. For these items categorization decisions did not change
from one session to the other, either.
According to the Threshold Theory (Hampton, 1995, 2007) a categorization decision
for a particular item comes about through the assessment of the similarity of the item’s
representation to the category’s representation. If the assessed similarity exceeds a certain
threshold, the item is endorsed as a category member; otherwise it is not. The Threshold
Theory accounts for the variable extension of categories by assuming that the threshold
criterion can vary from one person to the other or from one occasion to the other
(Hampton, 1995).
The Threshold Theory also reconciles the apparently contradictory finding
(Osherson & Smith, 1997) that items afford both a binary membership decision and a
The Probabilistic Threshold Model 4
continuous typicality judgment. The theory states that both phenomena arise from a
single underlying dimension (i.e., similarity to the category representation) that is common
to all respondents. The relationship between typicality and this similarity dimension is
assumed linear. Every single respondent is assumed to make a binary cut along the
dimension, separating category members from non-members. Since these cuts are all made
somewhere along the same dimension, averaging across respondents’ binary decisions (1
for yes, 0 for no) results in a continuous degree or probability of membership measure.
Because of inter-individual differences in the placement of the threshold criterion along
the dimension a monotonically increasing relationship (bounded between 0 and 1) between
similarity and degree or probability of membership is thus assumed (Hampton, 2007).
Hampton (1998) provides support for the Threshold Theory’s assumptions by
reanalyzing the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) data. McCloskey and Glucksberg had
one group of participants categorize 492 items in 18 categories. Another group was asked
to provide typicality ratings for the same material. Averaging the binary membership
decisions across respondents resulted in a probability of membership measure that
displayed the hypothesized relation with the average typicality ratings (i.e., similarity to
the category representation). Probability of category membership monotonically increased
with typicality, starting at a probability of zero at the low end of the typicality range,
demonstrating a profound rise among the moderately typical items, and attaining a
probability of one at the high end of the typicality range. The resulting curves for
individual categories were very similar in shape to the ones in Figure 2 (to be presented
later) that were obtained in a study that we conducted ourselves and will be discussed in
detail below. Furthermore, Hampton (1998) established the correlation between average
typicality and normalized membership probability (a transformation of membership
probability that would show a straight line function with typicality if the membership
curve followed the cumulative normal distribution function) at .93 (across all categories).
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The above procedure clearly supports the Threshold Theory, but is limited as a
formalization thereof. For one, it does not incorporate all of the Threshold Theory’s
assumptions. The procedure is, for instance, agnostic as to whether all respondents’
decisions actually display the structure the Threshold Theory proclaims. Is the
probability of endorsing atypical items as category members lower than the probability of
endorsing typical items in all individuals? Or is there a significant group of respondents
for which the probability of endorsing an item as a category member is the same,
regardless of typicality? Such divergences would not be picked up by the Hampton (1998)
procedure if the remaining participants were to adhere to the Threshold Theory
assumptions. These divergences would be lost in the averaging process instead. Related to
this issue is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Hampton (1998) procedure: It lacks a
clear counterpart for the threshold criterion notion. Individual respondents’ categorization
criteria are not made explicit, making it difficult to test hypotheses regarding the sources
of individual differences therein. For instance, it is not clear how one would go about
testing whether two groups of categorizers employ a different threshold along a common
scale based on their respective membership probability curves.
In what follows we will note the commonalities between the Threshold Theory and
the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen & Steinberg, 1986). We will argue that this item
response model incorporates many of the assumptions made by the Threshold Theory and
hence allows for a rigorous formal test of them by applying the model to an extensive
categorization data set. We will also determine whether the model is able to account for
the semantic categorization phenomena that were discussed by McCloskey and Glucksberg
(1978). More specifically we will verify whether the model can account for inter- and
intra-individual differences in categorization and their relationship with item typicality.
We will conclude by discussing the manners in which the model can be employed to test
hypotheses regarding the nature of category representations and the sources of
The Probabilistic Threshold Model 6
categorization differences.
The Probabilistic Threshold Model
The Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen & Steinberg, 1986) is an item response
model of which the properties are well understood. It was developed within the context of
aptitude testing where it is employed to estimate individuals’ proficiency with regard to a
number of questions of varying difficulty. It models the probability that person p endorses
item i. It does so by awarding both persons and items a position along a common, latent
scale. Their relative position then determines the probability of endorsement. Person p’s
position along the scale is indicated by θp. In the context of semantic categorization θp
can be understood to represent the person’s threshold criterion or the degree of
liberalness/conservatism the person displays when making categorization decisions. Each
item i ’s position along the scale is indicated by βi which in the current context would
represent the item’s similarity to the category representation. The difference between the
two positions (i.e., the value of βi − θp) determines the probability that p will endorse i as
a category member:
Pr(Ypi = 1) =
eα(βi − θp)
1 + eα(βi − θp)
(1)
Equation (1) expresses that the more βi exceeds θp on the latent scale, the higher
the probability of endorsing the item is, and vice versa. This is reminiscent of the
Threshold Theory’s claim that categorization decisions come about through the
assessment of the similarity of the item’s representation to the category’s representation.
This assessment results in the positioning of the items along a latent similarity scale (i.e.,
fixing the items’ βi values). The further along the scale an item is positioned, the higher
its similarity to the category representation is assumed to be.
According to the Threshold Theory a threshold criterion is then imposed on the
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scale to determine whether the assessed similarity affords a positive rather than a negative
categorization decision. We take the value of θp to indicate the position of this threshold
criterion. The probability expressed in Equation (1) decreases with θ. Low values of θp
indicate rather liberal categorizers for whom a modest degree of similarity suffices to
conclude category membership. High values of θp characterize more conservative
categorizers who require extensive similarity between item and category to conclude
category membership. We thus take the differences in the estimates of θp to correspond to
the inter-individual differences in the placement of the categorization threshold criterion
the Threshold Theory proclaims.
In Equation (1) an individual’s response is not said to be deterministic. Instead, the
Rasch model expresses the probability with which an individual will endorse a particular
item. Depending on the relative difference between the corresponding θp and βi values this
probability will differ. The resulting probability curve takes an S-shaped form, starting of
at a zero when the βi − θp difference is large and negative, demonstrating a profound
increase for small difference between βi and θp, and leveling off again when the difference
grows large and positive1. In this respect the model deviates from the original Threshold
Theory in which the threshold acts as a decision boundary that rigorously separates
members from non-members. According to the original theory items are, without
exception, classified as category members when their similarity to the category
representation surpasses the person’s threshold. Items whose similarity does not surpass
this threshold are not endorsed as category members. In the modeling framework we
propose the difference between the values of βi and θp determines the probability that p
will endorse i as a category member. To highlight this difference with the original
Threshold Theory, we will term the model the Probabilistic Threshold Model.
The probabilistic nature of the model becomes clear in Figure 1 that displays the
positions of a single person (θp) and two items (βi and βj) by means of tic marks along
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the horizontal axis. The items clearly differ with respect to their similarity to the category
representation. Item i is less similar to the category than item j which is evidenced by the
former being located lower on the common scale than the latter. The threshold of person p
lies in between the two items. The black curves in the figure indicate how the probability
of endorsing the items as category members changes as a function of θ. As βj surpasses θp
item j has a high probability of being endorsed by p. The dotted vertical line at position
θp in Figure 1 crosses the black response curve associated with βj close to a categorization
probability of 1. βi does not surpass θp and therefore has a low categorization probability
associated with it. The dotted vertical line at position θp crosses the black response curve
associated with βi close to a categorization probability of 0.
************************
Figure 1 about here.
************************
Now imagine a person whose θ is located to the left of both items. βi and βj then
surpass the categorization threshold and both would have high categorization probabilities
associated with them. Imagine a person whose threshold is located much further along the
latent similarity scale than that of person p. In fact, the degree of similarity this person
requires to favor a positive membership decision is that high that neither βi nor βj
surpasses the corresponding θ. Inspection of Figure 1 confirms that both items would have
a low probability of being endorsed.
The Probabilistic Threshold Model thus allows a categorization decision to be
considered the outcome of a chance experiment of which θp and βi are the parameters. If
we assume these parameters to remain the same, multiple repetitions of the experiment
will not always result in the same categorization decision. With each repetition of the
experiment, the probability that a person with a particular θp value will endorse an item
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with a particular βi value as a category member is given by Equation (1). The converse
probability represents the probability that the person will not endorse the item as a
category member. Depending on the values of these probabilities, a particular
categorization response might be more or less suspect to change from one occasion to the
other. In the item response models literature this interpretation of the probabilities
associated with θp is known as the stochastic subject interpretation. It opens up the
possibility to have the Probabilistic Threshold Model account for intra-individual
categorization differences without having to posit that they are due to changes in the
persons’ categorization threshold. Indeed, from McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) it is
known that the vagueness of semantic categorization may be seen in both intra- and
inter-individual categorization differences. In their study, different participants did not
agree on the items that could be considered category members, but individual respondents
also changed their mind when they were queried about the same items a month later.
Within the Threshold Theory framework differences in threshold location are thought
responsible for both kinds of differences (e.g., Hampton, 1995). Like the Threshold
Theory, the Probabilistic Threshold Model associates inter-individual categorization
differences with differences in threshold criteria (i.e., θp values). The model provides a
different account of intra-individual categorization differences, however. The theory is
agnostic as to why participants would employ a different threshold criterion in a
categorization session that is only different from the previous one in that it is organized
one month later. In its current form it would have to rely on extraneous justifications to
provide a satisfying account of intra-individual categorization differences. The
Probabilistic Threshold Model, on the other hand, offers an inherent explanation of these
categorization differences by positing that the process that underlies categorization
decisions is probabilistic in nature. Although the conversion of the deterministic
Threshold Theory into the Probabilistic Threshold Model might thus involve a deviation
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from the original, we believe this to be warranted since it promises to address both inter-
and intra-individual categorization differences in a single framework without harm to the
original theory’s interpretation or need to rely on extraneous justifications.
In the following section we will introduce a categorization study involving 8 natural
language categories with 24 items each. Because the nature of the items that are to be
categorized might vary across the different categories, a different scaling of the response
functions (the black curves in Figure 1) might be required for each category. To this end
we have included a parameter α in Equation (1) that is constant across all items of a
category but can vary from one category to the other. The Probabilistic Threshold Model
as expressed in Equation (1) will be fit to the data from the categorization study to assess
its appropriateness. This will determine whether categorization decisions indeed come
about through the placement of threshold criteria along a latent scale. To verify whether
the interpretation of the latent scale in terms of items’ similarity to the category
representation is justified, the correlation of the resulting βi’s with typicality ratings
provided by independent participants will be calculated. If typicality can be assumed to
increase linearly with similarity and the latent dimension can be interpreted as a specific
category’s similarity scale, a category’s βi’s should correlate strongly with that category’s
typicality ratings. The availability of typicality data also allows us to establish whether
the Probabilistic Threshold Model can account for the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978)
finding that inter- and intra-individual differences in categorization are most prevalent
among items of intermediate typicality. This would further validate the Probabilistic
Threshold Model and the interpretation of its parameter estimates and associated
probabilities.
A more general version of the model in which a separate αi is estimated for each
item will also be fitted to the categorization data. This model is known as the
two-parameter logistic model or 2PLM as it comes with two parameters (βi and αi) for
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every item (Birnbaum, 1968). This allows the shape of the probability response curves of
different items to differ from one another. The 2PLM wouldn’t require the slope of the
probability curves of βi and βj in Figure 1 to be the same, for instance. The 2PLM and
the Rasch model are often used next to one another in the item response literature. The
main reason for including the 2PLM in the current analyses is to verify whether any
important deviations from the categorization patterns suggested by the Probabilistic
Threshold Model exist that need to be substantiated. Possible explanations of such
deviations have been proposed by Hampton (1998, 2010) and include the familiarity of the
items, the ambiguity of the items, the believe that they can technically be considered
category members or not, or the belief that membership is dependent on whether one
takes the category in a broad or in a narrow sense. Similar systematic deviations that
allow for a substantive interpretation have been found in other applications of the 2PLM
within the semantic literature (e.g., Verheyen & Storms, 2010).
Method
Participants
Two hundred and ninety first year psychology students at the University of Leuven
participated for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Two hundred and fifty of them
completed a categorization task. The remaining forty students provided typicality ratings.
All participants were fluent speakers of Dutch.
Materials
Categories and items were taken from Hampton, Dubois, and Yeh (2006) who
constructed 8 categories with 24 items each to study contextual influences on
categorization. The categories consisted of two animal categories (fish and insects), two
artifact categories (furniture and tools), two borderline artifact-natural-kind categories
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(fruits and vegetables), and two activity categories (sciences and sports). The
corresponding category items included both clear members, clear non-members, and
borderline cases. All materials were translated into Dutch.
Procedure
The data collection took place in a large class room where all participants were
present at the same time. Each of them was handed an eight page questionnaire to fill out.
The students participating in the categorization task were told to carefully read through
the 24 items on each page and to decide for each item whether or not it belonged in the
category printed on top of the page. Participants indicated their answer by either circling
1 for yes or 0 for no. They were also given the opportunity to indicate that a particular
item was unknown to them. The categorization task took about 15 minutes to complete.
The students participating in the typicality rating task were to indicate on a 7-point
rating scale how typical they found the 24 items printed on each page to be of the
category displayed on top. It was explained to them that high responses on the scale were
to indicate that an item was very typical of the category, while low responses were to
indicate that it was very atypical. They too were given the opportunity to indicate that a
particular item was unknown to them. The typicality rating task took on average 20
minutes to complete.
Results
Participants rarely indicated that an item was unknown to them. A number of
participants did omit responses without specifying that the corresponding items were
unknown to them. Across the categorization and typicality rating task less than 2% of
data points were missing. Two tailed t tests indicated that the number of missing
responses did not correlate significantly with the average of the categorization or
typicality ratings in either of the categories (all p > .05). Figure 2 holds the averaged
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results of both tasks. For every category, the probability of making a positive membership
judgment was plotted against the respective items’ average typicality. Average typicality
appeared to be a good predictor of categorization probability. A few exceptions
notwithstanding, the probability of making a positive categorization decision increased
with typicality. While the atypical and very typical items afforded decisions that are quite
stable across participants, the decisions for the items of intermediate typicality were more
volatile. This resulted in items that are atypical of the category receiving categorization
probabilities that are close to 0, items that are of intermediate typicality receiving
categorization probabilities that span almost the entire probability range, and highly
typical items receiving categorization probabilities that are close to 1.
************************
Figure 2 about here.
************************
Averaged results that are similar to the ones that are presented here, have been
taken to support the Threshold Theory in the past (Hampton, 1998). The notion of a
threshold, which is a characteristic of individual categorizers, is absent in analyses that are
conducted at the aggregated level, however. To lend credibility to the Threshold Theory
we therefore analyzed the categorization decisions using the Rasch model (or the
Probabilistic Threshold Model as we call it in the context of the semantic categorization).
If the model can be shown to fit the categorization data, this would substantiate
Threshold Theory’s claim that categorization decisions come about through the placement
of individual decision criteria along a latent scale that also holds the items. If the items’
positions along this latent scale can then be shown to correlate with rated typicality, the
proclaimed relationship between categorization and typicality can be said to hold at the
level of individual participants, not just at the aggregated level.
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Validating the Probabilistic Threshold Model
The Probabilistic Threshold Model was fit to each category’s categorization data
using specialized software for item response analyses. The R package ltm employs
Marginal Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MMLE) to obtain estimates of βi, θp, and α.
For each of the eight included categories, 24 β estimates (one for every item i), 250 θ
estimates (one for every participant p), and one estimate of α were thus obtained. In
fitting the 2PLM to each category’s categorization data, 24 α estimates (one for every
item i) were obtained in addition to 24 β estimates and 250 θ estimates. Details of the R
procedures can be found in Rizopoulos (2006). The typicality ratings, which were
provided by an independent group of participants, were introduced after the model
estimation to give a substantive interpretation of the βi estimates.
It is important to note that the MMLE approach that was taken to estimate both
models is just one of many procedures to have been proposed for item response model
estimation (for an overview see Baker & Kim, 2004). As a test on our conclusions the
Probabilistic Threshold Model and 2PLM were also estimated under a Bayesian approach
using WinBUGS (Kim & Bolt, 2007; Lunn, Thomas, Best, & Spiegelhalter, 2000). The
conclusions of these analyses were the same as the ones drawn following the MMLE
analyses. The reported conclusions thus do not hinge upon the employed estimation
procedure.
***********************
Table 1 about here.
***********************
One can compare the relative fit of the models to the categorization data using
either the BIC statistic, the AIC statistic, or the likelihood ratio test. The BIC relative
goodness of fit statistics for the various categories can be found in Table 1. For fruits,
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vegetables, furniture, sciences, and sports the BIC indicated that the improvement in
fit does not warrant the extra parameters the 2PLM incorporates. The Rasch BIC for
these categories was lower than the 2PLM BIC. For fish, insects, and tools the BIC
suggested these additional parameters are warranted. The 2PLM BIC for these categories
was lower than the Rasch BIC. The AIC statistic and the likelihood ratio test, on the other
hand, indicated the 2PLM to be the relatively better fitting model for all eight categories.
The three test statistics thus do not yield a uniform answer to the question of which model
should be preferred. Therefore, to assess whether the Rasch model or the 2PLM is the
more suitable model for the categorization data, an omnibus test (described in Tuerlinckx
& De Boeck, 2005) was performed. Unlike the BIC statistic, the AIC statistic, and the
likelihood ratio test, the omnibus test constitutes an absolute measure of fit. We therefore
consider it an appropriate arbitrator in choosing between the Rasch model and the 2PLM.
The omnibus test entails a comparison of the deviance, defined as −2 times the
natural logarithm of the maximum likelihood, that was obtained after fitting either the
Rasch model or the 2PLM to the categorization data, with 100 replicated deviance values.
These were obtained by simulating 100 replicated data sets according to the models’
estimated parameters and re-fitting the model to these data sets. The resulting deviances
are then used to estimate the p-value of a goodness-of-fit test as follows:
pˆ =
1
100
100∑
j=1
I(devrepj > dev
obs), (2)
where devrepj refers to the deviance obtained from the j th replicated data set and I (C ) is
the indicator function taking value 1 if condition C is true and 0 otherwise. If a model fits
the data, the observed deviance should not differ too much from the simulated deviances,
resulting in a pˆ-value that is close enough to .50. The second column of Table 2 holds the
obtained pˆ-values for the Rasch model. The third column holds those obtained for the
2PLM. The Rasch pˆ-values did not deviate strongly from .50 indicating a sufficiently good
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fit of the Rasch model to the semantic categorization data. The 2PLM pˆ-values, on the
other hand, were close to 1 indicating that the model’s estimated parameters might
provide a good fit to the empirically obtained data, but do not allow generalization to
data sets that might have been obtained as well. We therefore believe the 2PLM to overfit
the data and the Rasch model to be the preferred model for the categorization data2.
***********************
Table 2 about here.
***********************
Since the omnibus tests that were performed constitute tests of the absolute fit of
the Rasch model to the categorization data, the pˆ-values that were obtained can also be
taken to indicate that semantic categorization occurs through the placement of decision
criteria along a common, latent dimension by individual respondents. Along this
dimension the various potential category members are organized. This is in line with the
assumptions of the Threshold Theory. To lend further support for the Rasch model as a
proper formalization of the Threshold Theory, the latent dimension on which the model
situates both persons’ criteria and items is to represent similarity to the category
representation. If we assume a linear relationship between typicality and similarity as did
Hampton (1998, 2007), this proves to hold. The correlation between βi and average rated
typicality was established at .96 for fruits, .97 for vegetables, .94 for fish , .97 for
insects, .97 for furniture , .97 for tools, .94 for sciences, and .98 for sports. These
were all very close to the maximum correlations afforded by the reliability of the typicality
ratings. The split-half correlations with Spearman-Brown correction were estimated at
.99, .99, .98, .98, .99, .99, .96, and .99, respectively.
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Accounting for the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) findings
The aim of the previous section was to establish whether the Threshold Theory
holds at the level of individuals making categorization decisions. By demonstrating that
the Rasch model is an appropriate model for semantic categorization, we provided
evidence for the Threshold Theory’s claim that individuals’ categorization decisions come
about through the placement of an individual criterion on a scale that is common to all
categorizers. A strong linear relationship between the items’ locations along the scale and
their rated typicality provided evidence that the similarity of the items’ representation
towards the category’s representation is at the basis of semantic categorization.
The Rasch model differs in one important respect from the original Threshold
Theory. It is probabilistic, rather than deterministic: The further along the scale an item
is located from an individual’s criterion, the higher the probability that the individual will
endorse the item, and vice versa. Because of this we termed the model the Probabilistic
Threshold Model. Before, we already mentioned that we believe the probabilistic nature
of the model to be an asset in that it promises to account for intra-individual differences,
next to inter-individual differences in semantic categorization. McCloskey and Glucksberg
(1978) were the first to demonstrate the vagueness of semantic categorization through
these differences. In this section we reiterate their findings and assess whether the
Probabilistic Threshold Model is able to bring them about for the data set under study.
When individuals require a different degree of similarity before endorsing an item as
a category member, inter-individual differences in categorization arise. McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) demonstrated that disagreement among categorizers is the highest for
items of intermediate typicality. They calculated the proportion of nonmodal
categorization responses at each level of the 10-point typicality scale they employed. At
typicality level 4 the proportion was the highest with a value of .36. The proportion of
nonmodal responses dropped off quickly towards both ends of the typicality scale. The
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same holds true for the categorization data under study. The proportion of nonmodal
categorization responses was established at .02, .08, .28, .37, .27, .08, and .02 at the seven
points of the typicality scale we employed.
In the Probabilistic Threshold Model every categorizer-item-pair is associated with
a value between 0 and 1 expressing the probability that the particular categorizer will
endorse the item she is faced with. The extent to which this probability deviates from 1 or
0 for items that on average will or will not be endorsed as category members, respectively,
constitutes a direct measure of the probability of providing a nonmodal response. If the
average categorizer is likely to endorse item i as a category member and the probability
that categorizer c endorses i is .83, for instance, there is a 17% probability that she will
provide the nonmodal response ’not a member’. In order to account for the McCloskey
and Glucksberg (1978) data on inter-individual differences in categorization, the
probability of providing a nonmodal response predicted by the Probabilistic Threshold
Model should drop off from items of intermediate typicality to items that are at the
extreme ends of the typicality scale.
************************
Figure 3 about here.
************************
For each level of the typicality scale that we employed in our study, Figure 3
expresses the probability of a nonmodal response as predicted by the Probabilistic
Threshold Model. To allow comparison with the results reported by McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) the predicted probability was calculated across all categorizers and
categories (in the manner that was demonstrated before). Nonmodal responses appeared
most likely for items that were judged to be of intermediate typicality. The highest
probability was predicted at typicality level 4 of the 7-point typicality scale. The
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probability of a nonmodal response was estimated at .36 for this typicality level. At
typicality levels 3 and 5 nonmodal responses were still likely to occur, with estimates of
.28 and .26, respectively. At the atypical end of the scale the probability of a nonmodal
response was much lower with probabilities of .07 and .02 for typicality levels 2 and 1. A
similar drop was noticeable at the highly typical end of the scale. The probability of a
nonmodal response was estimated at .08 for typicality level 6 and at .02 for typicality level
7. The results are in accordance with our own empirical findings and those by McCloskey
and Glucksberg, indicating that the Probabilistic Threshold Model correctly predicts the
occurrence of nonmodal responses to be a function of typicality, with inter-individual
differences occurring more often among items of intermediate typicality than among
atypical or highly typical items.
A similar conclusion was reached by McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) for
intra-individual differences in categorization. These were found to occur most often for
items of intermediate typicality as well. The proportion of within-categorizers
inconsistencies was determined to be the highest at typicality level 4 of 10 with a value of
.22. Hampton et al. (2006) also studied within-categorizers inconsistencies. They used the
same stimuli we employ here, to establish the proportion of inconsistencies at the middle
of the typicality scale around .18. At none of the other levels of the typicality scale was
this proportion found to be higher. As was indicated before, in the Probabilistic Threshold
Model the probability associated with an individual encountering a particular item to
categorize has a natural interpretation in terms of intra-individual differences. We referred
to this interpretation of the probabilities as the stochastic subject interpretation. If the
probability with which categorizer c will endorse item i is .77, for instance, the probability
that she will provide the opposite response is .23. If we determine the probability that
categorizers will deviate from their most likely response for all items and determine the
average of these probabilities for each level of the typicality scale, we can verify whether
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the Probabilistic Threshold Model correctly predicts the McCloskey and Glucksberg
finding that these deviations are most likely for items of intermediate typicality. Note that
the manner in which the probabilities of within-categorizers inconsistencies are derived is
different from the procedure to obtain the probability of nonmodal responses. To
determine the probability of a person’s nonmodal response for item i reference was made
to the dominant categorization decision across categorizers. To determine the probability
of a person’s inconsistency, we will make reference to that person’s dominant response to
i. In the above example the latter probability was estimated to be .23. If the dominant
response across categorizers for item i would be to deny it as a category member, the
probability of a nonmodal response by categorizer c would be estimated at .77.
************************
Figure 4 about here.
************************
Figure 4 shows the probability of a categorization inconsistency predicted by the
model, averaged across persons and categories, for each level of the typicality scale. The
Probabilistic Threshold Model expressed inconsistencies to be most likely for items of
intermediate typicality. The highest probability was predicted at typicality level 4 with a
value of .26. The probabilities at typicality levels 3 and 5 were somewhat smaller with
estimates of .23 and .21, respectively. The probability of a categorization inconsistency
then quickly dropped off toward both ends of the typicality scale. Atypical items were
associated with an average inconsistency probability of .07 at typicality level 2 and .02 at
typicality level 1. Typical items were associated with a low average inconsistency
probability as well. At typicality level 6 this probability was estimated at .07. At
typicality level 7 it was estimated at .02. The results are in accordance with the
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) finding and its replication by Hampton et al. (2006).
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The Probabilistic Threshold Model correctly identifies the items of intermediate typicality
to be those for which categorization inconsistency is most likely.
In addition, the model correctly indicated the probability of within-categorizers
inconsistencies to be lower than the probability of between-categorizers differences at the
intermediate level of typicality. While in Figure 4 the maximum probability was estimated
at .26, it was estimated at .36 in Figure 3. In McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) the
maximum proportion of inconsistencies was estimated at 22%, while the maximum
proportion of nonmodal responses was estimated at 36%.
This finding allows one to compare the Probabilistic Threshold Model, which
includes a separate threshold for every participant, to a related model that assumes all
participants to employ the same threshold criterion3. In all other respects the
Probabilistic Threshold Model and this dummy model are the same. The latter model was
also fitted to the categorization data under study. Unlike the Probabilistic Threshold
Model, it predicted the probability of inconsistencies to be as high as the probability of
nonmodal responding. This is clearly not in line with the McCloskey and Glucksberg
(1978) findings, where intra-individual differences were found to be less prevalent than
inter-individual differences.
Investigating threshold criterion stability
The results above support the Threshold Theory in general, and the Probabilistic
Threshold Model in specific, as a framework for the study of what one could call
“traditional” semantic categorization behavior. With the model offering estimates of
individuals’ threshold criteria θp it also becomes possible to study aspects of semantic
categorization that have been rather neglected. One could, for instance, investigate to
what extent the degree of liberalness/conservatism exhibited by a person in one category
generalizes to another. To this end we correlated the participants’ θp estimates for the
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eight natural language categories they were presented with. One-tailed t-tests indicated
that 22 of these (8× 7)/2 = 28 correlations were significant at the .05 level of significance.
A one-sample t-test on the to Fisher z ’s transformed correlations indicated these
correlations to come from a distribution with a mean greater than zero
(t(27) = 9.97, p < .001, one-tailed). Despite the fact that the correlations were of moderate
magnitude (the maximum correlation, between furniture and tools, only reached .34)
these results point toward a considerable amount of stability in categorization behavior.
In what follows we will discuss how the Probabilistic Threshold Model can be extended to
uncover sources of variability and stability in semantic categorization.
General Discussion
Because of differences in range and discriminatory power, typicality and degree or
probability of category membership have been said to tap into fundamentally different
aspects of conceptual representations (Osherson & Smith, 1997). The fact that graded
membership is bounded between 0 and 1, while typicality is thought of as being
unbounded, is generally taken to support this argument. The Threshold Theory
(Hampton, 1995, 2007) contests these claims. It states that both notions relate to a single
underlying dimension: Typicality is understood to increase linearly with a metric of
similarity, while degree of category membership is assumed to increase monotonically with
this similarity metric. Hampton (1998) has provided evidence for these assumptions at the
aggregated level. If one averages across respondents’ discrete categorization decisions, a
continuous measure of category membership arises that increases monotonically with
typicality. At the level of individual participants, however, the Threshold Theory has to
account for the discrete categorization decisions that are made. It does so by assuming
that participants place a threshold criterion on the similarity metric that distinguishes
category members from non-members. As the similarity metric is assumed common to all
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participants, they are all suspected to adhere to it when making categorization decisions:
An item that is low in similarity to the category representation should be less likely to be
endorsed than an item that is higher in similarity by every single respondent. Of course
participants can differ in the degree of similarity they require to endorse an item (i.e. the
placement of the threshold criterion). In fact, these individual differences are required for
the monotonically increasing relationship of the averaged category membership measure
with similarity and typicality to come about. If all respondents employed the same
threshold criterion, averaging across their categorization decisions would result in a
discrete measure of category membership instead of a continuous one. McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) already established that there are inter-individual differences in
categorization, especially for items that are of intermediate typicality for the category.
We advanced an item response model to formally assess whether the categorization
decisions made by individual respondents adhere to the Threshold Theory assumptions.
The Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen & Steinberg, 1986) is the formal equivalent of the
Threshold Theory in that it assumes that categorization decisions come about through the
placement of a decision criterion along a latent scale that is common to all categorizers.
The model awards both categorizers and items a position along this scale. The relative
position of categorizer and item determines whether or not the item will be endorsed. The
more the item’s position exceeds the categorizer’s position along the scale, the more likely
it becomes that the item will be endorsed, and vice versa. The categorizers’ positions can
therefore be understood as their threshold criteria, while the items’ positions can be
thought to reflect their similarity to the category representation. We termed the Rasch
model with this interpretation of its parameters the Probabilistic Threshold Model.
The Probabilistic Threshold Model was applied to categorization data for eight
natural language categories. For each of these data sets the model analysis yielded an
underlying dimension along which both items and persons could be located. The items’
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positions were shown to correlate strongly with average typicality as rated by independent
judges. This validated the Threshold Theory at the level of individual categorizers. In
addition, we showed that the Probabilistic Threshold Model demonstrated the
relationship between inter-individual differences in categorization and typicality that
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) had established. They found that nonmodal
categorization responses were most prevalent among items of moderate typicality. The
same was true when the expected proportion of nonmodal responses was expressed as the
modeled probability that categorizers would deviate from the average categorization
decision according to the Probabilistic Threshold Model.
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) established that intra-individual differences in
categorization follow a similar pattern. Items of intermediate typicality are most likely to
receive different categorization decisions on various occasions. While the original
Threshold Theory explicitly accounted for inter-individual categorization differences by
assuming that different categorizers employ different threshold criteria, it has not been
that explicit about these intra-individual differences in categorization. In order to account
for them the Threshold Theory would have to propose that individuals’ threshold criteria
change from one occasion to the other. This follows from its assumption that
categorization involves a deterministic decision process that always results in items
surpassing the threshold being endorsed as category members, and items falling below the
threshold always being considered non-members. Although this could certainly be a valid
position to take, one could also make the possibility of a change in categorization decision
inherent to the relative position of the item and the person’s threshold. This is the
approach taken by the Probabilistic Threshold Model. The closer to each other the
positions of threshold and item are estimated to be, the higher the probability of a
categorization change. This is the case because in the Probabilistic Threshold Model a
categorization decision is considered the outcome of a chance experiment constituted by
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parameters θp and βi. In the event that both parameters are estimated to be the same,
Equation (1) establishes the probability of p endorsing i at .5, indicating that the
categorization decision could go either way. This is also apparent in Figure 1. When θp is
estimated to coincide with either βi or βj , the corresponding response functions indicate
the categorization probability to equal .5. Consequently, it would be considered highly
likely that person p would provide different answers on two categorization occasions.
When the expected proportion of within-categorizers inconsistencies was determined
according to this uncertainty that the Probabilistic Threshold Model associates with each
categorization decision, it was found that it was most prevalent for items of intermediate
typicality. Its ability to demonstrate the McCloskey and Glucksberg findings on inter- and
intra-individual categorization differences lends further credibility to the Probabilistic
Threshold Model.
Explanatory item response models
Our main endeavor here has been to establish whether or not the Probabilistic
Threshold Model is a suitable model for semantic categorization behavior. Because of this,
the presented work is of an exploratory nature: Item response models were applied to
empirical data, their fit was assessed, and attempts were made to relate the constituting
parameters to an external empirical measure. As the Rasch model constitutes the first
formal instantiation of the Threshold Theory, we deemed such an exploratory approach
warranted in order to establish the model’s appropriateness. It is, however, also possible
to take an explanatory approach in which the external empirical measures are brought
into the models (De Boeck & Wilson, 2004). Item and/or person characteristics are then
incorporated in the item response models to test whether they can account for the
variability found among the item and person parameters, respectively.
Up until now we have been fairly quiet about the nature of the dimension that
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underlies the participants’ semantic categorization decisions. We noted that it expresses
the similarity of the items towards the category (i.e., typicality), but we did not elaborate
on the nature of the representations involved (e.g., stored exemplars, an abstracted central
tendency, ... - see Komatsu, 1992 for an overview). If one had specific hypotheses about
the measures that determine an item’s position along the latent scale one could test these
by expressing the βi’s as a linear combination of these predictors. For instance, according
to the generalized polymorphous concept model, the similarity between an item and a
category can be expressed as a weighted combination of the number of characteristic
features shared by item and category, and the number of features that are distinct to the
item (Dry & Storms, 2010). Dry and Storms demonstrated how both common and
distinctive feature information play a role in the prediction of items’ typicality ratings
(i.e., item-category-similarity). If one would want to learn whether and to what extent
this finding generalizes to categorization, one could do so by employing the linear logistic
test model (Fischer, 1995; Janssen, Schepers, & Peres, 2004). This model can be
considered an explanatory version of the Rasch model in that it expresses the βi’s as a
linear combination of item predictors, in this case feature commonality (FC ) and feature
distinctiveness (FD):
βi = γ0 + γFCFCi + γFDFDi + εi with εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (3)
with γFC and γFD expressing the effects of feature commonality and feature
distinctiveness, respectively, and γ0 taking the role of intercept. When incorporated in the
Probabilistic Threshold Model, (3) would allow for a test of the generalizability of the
positive contribution of common features and the negative contribution of distinctive
features to item-category-similarity, found by Dry and Storms. One could also imagine
using this model to test whether different kinds of categories differ with respect to the
relative contribution of common and distinctive features (e.g., natural kinds versus
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artifacts or concrete versus abstract categories; see also Stukken, Verheyen, Dry, &
Storms, 2009).
To further strengthen the proposed interpretation of βi, we constructed an
explanatory version of the Probabilistic Threshold Model in which βi is regressed upon
rated typicality in the same manner βi is regressed upon feature commonality and feature
distinctiveness in Equation (3). Where before the typicality ratings were introduced after
the model had been estimated to aid interpretation of its parameters, the effect of rated
typicality on the βi’s is now determined while the model is applied to the categorization
data. In all eight categories typicality proved to be a significant predictor of the items’
positions along the latent scale, accounting for 96% of the variance in βi for the fruits
category, 94% for vegetables, 90% for fish , 95% for insects, 96% for furniture , 95% for
tools, 90% for sciences, and 97% for sports. The estimated regression weight was
positive in all categories, indicating that the higher an item’s typicality, the further along
the latent scale it would be found. These same conclusions had been reached earlier, based
on the strong positive correlation between the (independent) βi estimates and typicality
ratings.
Inter-individual differences in categorization
Just as external variables can be brought into the Probabilistic Threshold Model to
explain the variability among the items, so external variables can be brought into the
model to elucidate the sources of variability among persons (Van den Noortgate & Paek,
2004). At the theoretical level there seems to be general agreement about semantic
categorization behavior resulting from the interplay of the respondents’ individual learning
histories and the effects exerted by the immediate context they find themselves in (e.g.,
Barsalou, 1993; Smith & Samuelson, 1997). Empirical investigations into the sources of
inter-individual differences in categorization are rare, however. Maybe this is the case
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because up until now no principled way of determining individuals’ degree of
liberalness/conservatism in semantic categorization existed. The Probabilistic Threshold
Model does offer such a measure in the form of the individuals’ threshold criteria θp.
One could imagine employing the Probabilistic Threshold Model to investigate
whether in semantic categorization there are systematic threshold shifts with age
(Bjorklund, Thompson, & Ornstein, 1983; Lin, Schwanenflugel, & Wisenbaker, 1990). One
only has to hear a child discuss her immediate environment to realize that the extensions
of the categories she employs do not always match those held by adults. Overextensions
are probably the most commonly found extension differences between children and adults.
They occur when the child is excessively liberal in allowing items into a category (Clark,
1973). A child that refers to all four-legged animals as dogs, for example, is making an
overextension error. The reverse phenomenon - an excessively conservative use of a
category label - is called an underextension (Nelson, 1974). It occurs when the child
restricts the use of dog to German shepards only, for example. Underextension is much
less likely to be noted than overextension in a child’s spontaneous speech, since it involves
the absence of a behavior. A categorization task like the one we employed in the current
study might be ideally suited to detect underextension errors since it requires overt
behavior from the child. If the Probabilistic Threshold Model could be fit to
categorization data of various age groups simultaneously and systematic shifts (either
more conservative or more liberal placement of the categorization threshold with age) in
the person parameters θp could be shown to exist, considerable understanding of the
manner in which children acquire categories can be achieved. Indeed, the compatibility of
the Probabilistic Threshold Model and such developmental data would establish that
young children already know about the single dimension that underlies categorization
decisions, but do not yet agree with adults on the appropriate region to place the
categorization threshold. If such results would be cast in the terminology of the previous
The Probabilistic Threshold Model 29
section, they could be taken to suggest that even young children know about the
characteristic features that make up the underlying dimension, but do not accord them
the same weight in categorization as adults do. This would corroborate existing theories of
concept development (e.g., Johnson & Eilers, 1998; Mervis, 1984, 1987). Alternatively,
shifts in item parameters across age groups would indicate a developmental reorganization
of the category structure (see for example Keil & Batterman, 1984).
Similarly, one could imagine verifying whether a context manipulation induces a
change in the employed threshold criterion. Braisby (Braisby, 1993, 2005) has noted that
the clear context or purpose that helps shape natural discourse is generally absent in
categorization tasks as they are performed in the psychology lab. He suggests that the
variability in categorization decisions might arise from the lack of a clear context.
Accordingly, Hampton et al. (2006) proposed a study in which categorization decisions
were to be made in one of two clearly specified contexts. It was expected that in
pragmatic contexts, people would take a broad view of what may be included in a
category, whereas in technical contexts, the category boundary would be drawn more
tightly. Contrary to these expectations, no difference was found between the conditions in
the overall proportion of positive categorizations. In addition, categorization probabilities
in each condition correlated equally strongly with typicality ratings that were provided by
a group of participants who didn’t receive a specified task context. It would be interesting
to see whether an analysis using the Probabilistic Threshold Model might have a better
chance of revealing context effects, as it takes the (typicality) structure of the data into
account and does not carry the danger of obscuring possible important individual
differences through aggregation.
Gardner (1953) was among the first to introduce the notion of a threshold in the
context of categorization behavior and to study inter-individual differences therein. He
argued for the existence of inter-individual criterion levels that remain stable across
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different categorization tasks. In other words, a respondent who is found to be a rather
conservative categorizer in one task, would also be expected to employ a rather strict
criterion level in another categorization task. Following Gardner’s suggestion we
correlated the participants’ θp estimates for the eight natural language categories they
were presented with. The resulting correlations were found to come from a distribution
with a mean greater than zero. This result lends support to Gardner’s claim. Uncovering
the personality characteristics that are responsible for the relative stability of
categorization thresholds might therefore constitute another route to take the
Probabilistic Threshold Model along in future research.
As a priori hypotheses concerning these relatively unexplored matters might be
scarce, one might want to start by establishing whether there are groups of categorizers
that differ substantially from one another. Rather than assuming that all categorizers are
alike or that all categorizers are different from one another, one could look for latent
groups of similarly performing categorizers. This is the approach taken by, among others,
Lee and Webb (2005), Palmeri and Nosofsky (1995), Vanpaemel and Navarro (2007), and
Verheyen and Storms (2007). It is straightforward to implement this demand for potential
latent classes in the framework of the Probabilistic Threshold Model. Braeken and
Tuerlinckx (2009) illustrate how to employ a finite mixture approach to solve the problem
of determining the number of latent person groupings in estimating an item response
model. One can imagine applying this procedure in the context of categorization to
determine the number and nature of categorizer groups that are required. The model that
is identified in this manner is situated somewhere between the Probabilistic Threshold
Model, which includes a separate categorization criterion for every participant, and its
dummy counterpart that assumes one criterion that is common to all participants. If the
data permit, the Probabilistic Threshold Model may be employed in this manner to
uncover groups of categorizers that adopt fundamentally different category
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representations.
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Footnotes
1To attain this characteristic, item response models originally assumed a cumulative
normal distribution. This was later changed to a logistic function so that model
estimation would become easier. The Threshold Theory originally also assumed a
cumulative normal distribution: Hampton (1998) employed a transformation of
categorization probability that would show a straight line function with typicality if the
membership curve follows the cumulative normal distribution (see our description earlier).
This assumption is somewhat relaxed in Equation (1) that allows for a broader range of
probability curves. The inclusion of the α parameter in Equation (1) allows to test
whether this relaxation is required. If α is estimated to lie close to 1.702 the probability
curves resemble a cumulative normal distribution. See in this respect footnote 2.
2The model in Equation (1) with α fixed at 1 has many applications in the item
response literature. In the current context it can be set off against the Rasch model to
verify whether it was worthwhile having a different α estimated for each category. All
three relative goodness of fit statistics and the omnibus absolute goodness of fit test
indicated that this was the case. The BIC, AIC, and likelihood ratio test indicated that
the Rasch model with estimated α was the preferred model, except for fruits and
vegetables. A similar conclusion was reached based on the omnibus test. It indicated
that the Rasch model with α fixed at 1 provided a sufficiently good fit to the
categorization data for fruits and vegetables, but not for the data of any of the other
categories. Note that this does not impact on the conclusions reported in the text as α
was of course estimated to lie close to 1 when the Rasch model in Equation (1) was fit to
the fruits and vegetables categorization data. For none of the categories was α
estimated to lie close to 1.702 (the maximum estimated α was 1.468). If it were, the
logistic function relating the latent dimension to response probability would closely
resemble a cumulative normal distribution.
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3We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this comparison.
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Table 1
BIC relative goodness of fit statistics for the Rasch model and the 2PLM.
BIC
Category Rasch 2PLM
Fruits 3437.68 3500.12
Vegetables 3597.09 3641.92
Fish 4209.25 4071.85
Insects 4853.11 4838.51
Furniture 3720.40 3736.67
Tools 4221.28 4179.51
Sciences 4784.56 4809.06
Sports 3824.12 3842.51
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Table 2
Omnibus absolute goodness of fit statistics for the Rasch model and the 2PLM.
pˆ
Category Rasch 2PLM
Fruits .62 .96
Vegetables .70 .95
Fish .58 .82
Insects .69 .81
Furniture .76 .96
Tools .73 .92
Sciences .46 .90
Sports .53 .84
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Illustration of the Probabilistic Threshold Model.
Figure 2. Scatterplots of the probability of a positive categorization versus average item
typicality.
Figure 3. Probability of nonmodal responses as a function of typicality level.
Figure 4. Probability of within-categorizers inconsistencies as a function of typicality level.
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